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Abstract
We study the licensing incentives of an independent input producer
owning a patented product innovation which allows the downstream rms
to improve the quality of their nal goods. We consider a general two-part
tari¤ contract for both outside and incumbent innovators. We nd that
technology di¤usion critically depends on the nature of market competi-
tion (Cournot vs. Bertrand). Moreover, the vertical merger with either
downstream rm is always privately protable and it is welfare improving
for large innovations: this implies that not all protable mergers should
be rejected.
Keywords: Patent licensing, two-part tari¤, vertical di¤erentiation,
vertical integration.
1 Introduction
We study the licensing incentives of an independent input producer owning
a patented product innovation which allows the downstream rms to improve
the quality of their nal goods. We consider a general two-part tari¤ contract
for both outside and incumbent innovators. We endogenize market structure
as in Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) allowing the patent holder to vertically
integrate with either downstream rm. We also provide the welfare analysis.
More precisely, we consider two downstream rms producing and selling a
nal output to heterogeneous consumers and two di¤erentiated inputs in the
upstream market, a low quality input provided by competitive rms and a high
quality patented input provided by an independent input producer. The quality
of the nal good depends on the quality of the input. Complete technology
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di¤usion implies a homogeneous nal good of high quality, whereas exclusive
licensing implies a vertically di¤erentiated market.
We nd that technology di¤usion critically depends on the nature of market
competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand). When rms compete in the quantities, the
innovation is sold to all rms thus ensuring complete technology di¤usion as well
as a homogeneous good in the market. In contrast, when rms compete in the
prices, the innovator has no incentive for complete technology di¤usion, rather
he prefers exclusive licensing which implies a vertically di¤erentiated market
and in turn positive industry prot to extract. In particular the internal patent
holder does not license its innovation to the rival rm; the external patent holder
sells only one license via a xed fee.
As far as the merger protability is concerned, we show that under Cournot
competition the vertical integration of the upstream inventor with either down-
stream rm is always privately protable. This result is in line with the new
market foreclosure theory (see Rey and Tirole 2007) according to which vertical
integration allows the monopolist upstream producer to protect its monopoly
power. This result is in contrast with Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) that con-
sider non-drastic process innovations in a horizontally di¤erentiated Cournot
duopoly and nd that the merger is privately protable only for small innova-
tions. They point out the commitment problem faced by the vertical merger
(that is the insider innovator) which has only one instrument, the licensing con-
tract to the rival rm rather than two (a licensing contract to each downstream
rm), and cannot credibly restrict its output as the new input is transferred at
marginal cost. However this result breaks down in our model as the incentive
to di¤use the innovation makes homogeneous the downstream market. As for
social welfare protability, we nd that under Cournot competition the merger is
also welfare improving for large innovations; this implies that not all protable
mergers should be rejected. Indeed on one hand, the merger pushes prices down
as it implies the (partial) internalization of the vertical externality; on the other
hand, the merger has an anticompetitive e¤ect because the vertically integrated
rm is able to (partially) foreclose the rival rm via a positive per-unit royalty.
The rst e¤ect prevails as long as the quality improvement associated with the
innovation is su¢ ciently large. Under Bertrand competition, we nd a result of
equivalence between an external and an internal patent holder, both in terms of
private and social welfare protability. Indeed, an external patent holder sells
an exclusive license via a xed fee, so that there is no distortion due to a positive
per-unit royalty (as the patent holder were vertically integrated). This way the
patent holder maximizes the licensees prot and extract this prot up to the
outside option.
This paper contributes to the literature on licensing a product innovation as
well as to the debate on the competitive e¤ects of vertical integration.
From a theoretical viewpoint, most of the literature on optimal licensing
focuses on cost-reducing, process innovations (see Kamien and Tauman, 1986;
Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Kamien, Oren and Tauman, 1992; Sen and Tauman,
2007; Erutku and Richelle, 2007). To our knowledge, little has been done to
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investigate the issue of licensing a product innovation.1 In particular, we nd
that under Cournot competition with homogeneous goods, the external patent
holder optimally species positive per-unit royalties when the innovation is large.
This is in line with the wide prevalence of per-unit royalties over xed fee in
practice (see for instance, Rostoker (1984)). Moreover, Muto (1993) studies
optimal licensing of a process innovation and shows that Bertrand competition
is a rationale to explain this empirical evidence. We argue that this theoretical
result does not hold for a product innovation: in our model the external patent
holder prefers xed fee over royalty licensing.
As for the competitive e¤ects of vertical integration, there are two opposite
views. The Chicago School (e.g., Bork, 1978; Posner, 1976) stresses that, in
the absence of e¢ ciency gains, vertical integration could not increase the prof-
itability of merging rms (Rey and Tirole, 2007). In contrast the new market
foreclosure theory stresses the role played by vertical integration in restricting
downstream competition. We show that the social welfare protability depends
on the innovation size.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set
up the ante-innovation model. In Section 3 we introduce the product innovation
and we study the licensing incentives of an external innovator. In Section 4
we consider the optimal strategy of an internal innovator. In Section 5, we
compare the private and social incentives. In Section 6 we extend the analysis
to Bertrand competition.
2 Model
We consider two rms producing a homogeneous good and competing à la
Cournot.2 Final output production requires an essential input provided by a
competitive upstream market.
As far as the demand side is concerned, we assume that there is a continuum
of consumers indexed by  which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1].
Thus,  is a taste parameter. Each consumer has a unit demand and buys either
one unit of a good of quality s at price p or buys nothing at all. Consumers
utility takes the following form:
U() =

s  p, if consumer type  buys
0, if does not buy
The demand for the good is then
Q (p) = 1 
p
s

() p (Q) = s (1 Q) ; (1)
1However, as pointed out by Kamien et al. (1988) "a product innovation can be regarded
as a cost reducing innovation by assuming that the new product could have been produced
before but with a su¢ ciently high marginal cost that rendered its production unprotable."
2Given a homogeneous nal good, price competition leads to the Bertrand paradox. We
extend the analysis to Bertrand competition in Section 6.
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where Q = q1 + q2 and p=s is the fraction of consumers with a taste parameter
less than , that is the fraction of consumers not buying the good.3 For future
reference we dene the consumer surplus as
CS (s) =
1Z
p
s
(s  p) d = (p  s)
2
2s
(2)
As for the supply side, the essential input of quality s is produced at zero
xed cost fL = 0 and at constant marginal cost c = 0 and it is sold at the
competitive price w = 0. In this framework quality is assimilated to input. The
D rm i prot function is: i = pqi. D rms compete in the quantities, then
the Cournot duopoly equilibrium is (superscript C stands for Cournot):
qCi (ci = 0; cj = 0; s; s) =
1
3
(3)
pC =
s
3
Ci =
s
9
(4)
CSC =
2
9
s
The D rmsprice and prots depend on the quality of the input s. The D rms
sell Q = q1 + q2 = 23 which is the demand for the input faced by the upstream
market (perfect vertical complementarity).
For future reference (and as a benchmark) consider the monopoly outcome
for this market:4
pm =
s
2
;
qm =
1
2
;
m =
s
4
> 2Ci .
3 Innovation
Suppose that an independent input producer obtains a patented product inno-
vation which allows the downstream rms to improve the quality of their nal
goods. In the upstream market there is now a monopolist selling an input that
ameliorates nal product quality by  > 1 that measures the innovation size.
Assume production cost is fH = f > 0 for the high quality input.
We study the licensing incentives of this patent holder. The U rm can sell
the new input either to one or both D rms via a two-part licensing contract
3At equilibrium the market is not covered.
4The monopolist maximization problem would be maxp [p (1  p=s)].
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(r; F ).5 Di¤erent cases derive:
1. Complete technology di¤usion: both D rms adopt the new input and
we have a homogeneous nal good of quality s > s. D rmsprots
i (ci; cj ; s ; s ) depends on the two part-tari¤ contracts ci = (ri; Fi)
with i = 1; 2 and i 6= j.
2. Exclusive licensing : only one of the D rms adopt the new input and we
have two nal goods of di¤erent qualities. The non-innovating rm, say
rm 1, produces the low quality good thus incurring zero production costs
and gains 1 (0; c2; s; s ); while the innovating rm 2 produces the high
quality good and gets 2 (c2; 0; s ; s).
We develop a three-stage game: rst, the innovator o¤ers a contract to
each D rm on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; second, the potential licensees decide
whether to accept or reject the contract; nally the D rms compete. Solving
backwards, we nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3.1 Exclusive licensing
Suppose that only one D rm adopts the new input. Firm 1 does not buy the
new input and produces a nal good of quality s1 = s at price p1; rm 2 adopts
the new input and produces a nal good of quality s2 =  s > s, at price p2
with s2   s1 = s (   1). The demands for the goods are:
q1 = b   p1
s
(5)
q2 = 1  b; (6)
where b = p2   p1
s (   1) :
The inverse demands are:
p1 = s (1  q2   q1)
p2 = s (    q2   q1)
D rms prots are:
1 = p1q1
2 = (p2   r2) q2   F2
5A two-part licensing contract covers both the case of the royalty and the case of the xed
fee licensing modes: a royalty can be seen as a two-part tari¤ with F = 0; the xed fee can
be seen as a two-part tari¤ with r = 0.
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Cournot competition leads to the following third stage quantity and price equi-
librium:
q1 (0; r2; s; s ) =
s + r2
s (4   1) ;
q2 (r2; 0; s ; s) =
(2s   s  2r2)
s (4   1) ;
p1 (0; r2; s; s ) =
(s + r2)
(4   1) ;
p2 (r2; 0; s ; s) =
(2   1) (s + r2)
(4   1) ;
with q2 (r2; 0; s ; s) > 0 () s(2  1)2 > r2. Firm1 prot is then:
1 (0; r2; s; s ) =
(s + r2)
2
(4   1)2 s (7)
As for rm 2:
2 (r2; 0; s ; s) =
 (s  2s + 2r2)2
(4   1)2 s   F2
The U rm chooses the two-part tari¤ contract for rm 2 (r2; F2) such that:
max
r2;F2
U
s:t:r2 2

0;
s (2   1)
2

F2  2 (r2; 0; s ; s)  s
9
with U =
(2s  s 2r2)
s(4  1) r2 + F2   f . The rst constraint comes from the non-
negativity of q2 and the second constraint (binding at equilibrium) ensures that
rm 2 has the incentive to get the license rather than the status quo. The
solution is a contract such that r2 = 0 and F

2 =
(36 2 16 +1)(  1)s
9(4  1)2 . Remaining
equilibrium variables are (superscript EL stands for exclusive licensing):
qEL1 =
 
(4   1) ; q
EL
2 =
(2   1)
(4   1) ; QEL =
(3   1)
(4   1)
pEL1 =
 s
(4   1) ; p
EL
2 =
(2   1) s
(4   1) ;
1 (s; s ) =
 2s
(4   1)2 < 2 (s ; s) =
s
9
ELU (s; s ) =
(36 2 16 +1)(  1)s
9(4  1)2   f:
ELU is the U patent holder equilibrium prot under exclusive licensing, when
selling via a two-part tari¤, which reduces to a xed fee, the new input to only
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one D rm. For completeness we provide equilibrium consumer surplus under
exclusive licensing:
CSEL =
p2 p1
s(  1)Z
p1
s
(s  p1) d +
1Z
p2 p1
s(  1)
(s   p2) d = ( +4 
2 1)s 
2(4  1)2 :
3.2 Complete technology di¤usion
Suppose the U rm decides to sell the new input to both D rms via a two-part
tari¤ (r; F ). The U rm maximization problem is:
max
F1;r1;F2;r2
fr1q1 (r1; r2; s ; s ) + r2q2 (r1; r2; s ; s ) + F1 + F2   fg
s:t:1 (r1; r2; s ; s )  F1  1 (0; r2; s; s )
2 (r2; r1; s ; s )  F2  2 (0; r1; s; s )
r1  0; r2  0; F1  0; F2  0
where 1 (0; r2; s; s ) is dened in (7). Here the outside option for each rm is
not buying the new input given that the rival rm does. i (ri; rj ; s ; s ) and
qi (ri; rj ; s ; s ) denote the third stage equilibrium D rm i prot and quantity
when both rms produce the high quality good, namely:
i (ri; rj ; s ; s ) =
(s   2ri + rj)2
9 s
; (8)
qi (ri; rj ; s ; s ) =
1
3s 
(s   2ri + rj) : (9)
As the two constraints are binding at equilibrium, we have
F1 (r1; r2) = 1 (r1; r2; s ; s )  1 (0; r2; s; s ) ;
F2 (r1; r2) = 2 (r2; r1; s ; s )  2 (0; r1; s; s ) ;
with i (0; rj ; s; s ) =
(s +rj)
2
(4  1)2s . The maximization problem, thus becomes:
max
r1;r2
fr1q1 (r1; r2; s ; s ) + r2q2 (r2; r1; s ; s ) + F1 (r1; r2) + F2 (r1; r2)  fg :
The optimal contract is then:8<: r1 = r2 =
(s  26s 2+16s 3)
64 2 14 +4 , F (r1; r2) =
(248 2 17  272 3+256 4+1)s 
4(32 2 7 +2)2 if  > 1:585 6,
r1 = r2 = 0, F (0; 0) =
(  1)(16  1)s 
9(4  1)2 if  < 1:585 6.
(10)
This means that when the innovation is small the inventors incentive is to set
a per-unit price as low as possible, that is the optimal contract is a xed fee. In
contrast for large innovations we have a positive per-unit royalty.6
6This result is in line wih Sen and Tauman (2007).
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Equilibrium magnitudes are for  > 1:585 6 (superscript T stands for com-
plete technology di¤usion):7
qT (s ) =
(4 +16 2+1)
2(32 2 7 +2) ; Q
T =
(4 +16 2+1)
(32 2 7 +2)
pT =
(16 2 11 +1) s
(32 2 7 +2)
T (s ) =
(4 +16 2+1)
2
s 
4(32 2 7 +2)2
T (s )  F  (r; r) = 25(4  1)2s 2
4(32 2 7 +2)2
TU (s ) = 2r
qT (s ) + 2F  (r; r)  f = (16 
2 16 +1)s 
2(32 2 7 +2)   f
CST =
(4 +16 2+1)
2
s 
2(32 2 7 +2)2 ;
SWT = s 
(4 +16 2+1)
2
2(32 2 7 +2)2 +

2 25(4  1)
2s 2
4(32 2 7 +2)2 +
(16 2 16 +1)s 
2(32 2 7 +2)   f

Whereas for  < 1:585 6, equilibrium magnitudes are:
qT (s ) =
1
3
; QT =
2
3
pT (s ) =
s 
3
T (s ) =
s 
9
T (s )  F  (r; r) =  
2s
(4   1)2
TU (s ) = 2F
 (0; 0)  f = 2 (  1)(16  1)s 
9(4  1)2   f;
CST =
2
9
 s;
SWT =
2
9
 s+

2  
2s
(4  1)2 + 2
(  1)(16  1)s 
9(4  1)2   f

Comparing equilibrium variables under exclusive licensing and complete
technology di¤usion, we nd the following results.
Proposition 1 Under Cournot competition, the external patent holder always
prefers complete technology di¤usion, namely, TU (s )   ELU (s ) > 0. The
optimal contract is specied in (10).
A consequence of the innovators preferences towards technology di¤usion
is that the downstream market is not vertically di¤erentiated, as only the high
quality input is sold to both rms. In other words, the downstream market is
characterized by a homogeneous good.
7The condition  > 1:585 6 from the non-negativity of the optimal royalty.
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Comparing total quantities, prices, prots and consumer surpluses, we nd
the following rankings.
for  > 1:585 6 QEL > Q > QT , 2 (s ; s) > T (s )  F  (r; r) > 1 (s; s ) ,
for  < 1:585 6 QEL > Q = QT , 2 (s ; s) > T (s )  F  (r; r) = 1 (s; s )
8 pEL1 < p < pT < pEL2 , CST > CSEL > CS, SWT > SWEL
4 Vertical integration
We have considered so far, the case of an external innovator, i.e. the U rm does
not sell the nal good in the D market. Suppose now that the U producer and
one of the two D rms, say rm 2, merge, in this case the vertically integrated
(VI) rm is an internal patent holder and its prot consists of two parts: the
prot from selling the new input to the rival D rm 1 (if it decides to license)
and the prot from selling the high quality nal good 2.
We consider the following three-stage game: rst, the patent holder o¤ers a
contract to D rm 1, D rm 1 decides whether to accept it and nally market
competition takes place.
Proceeding backwards, consider the quantity competition between the VI
rm and rm 1 producing the same high quality nal good. The VI rm has
zero variable production costs as the new input is trasferred at the marginal
cost c2 = 0, whereas rm 1 incurs marginal cost r1:
qV I (0; r1; s ; s ) =
1
3s 
(s + r1)
q1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) =
1
3s 
(s   2r1)  0 () r1  s 
2
pV I = s (1  qV I (0; r1; s ; s )  q1 (r1; 0; s ; s )) = 1
3
(s + r1)
V I (0; r1; s ; s ) =
(s + r1)
2
9s 
  f
1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) =
(s   2r1)2
9 s
where qV I (0; r1; s ; s ) and q1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) are obtained from expression (9)
substituting properly ri and rj ; V I (0; r1; s ; s ) and 1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) are ob-
tained from expression (8) substituting properly ri and rj . The VI rm o¤ers
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rm 1 the two-part tari¤ contract (r1; F1) such that:8
max
r1;F1
fV I (0; r1; s ; s ) + r1q1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) + F1g
s:t:1 (r1; 0; s ; s )  F1  1 (0; 0; s; s )
r1 2

0;
s 
2

;
where 1 (0; 0; s; s ) =
 2s
(4  1)2 , obtained from (7) is rm 1 outside option, that
is rm 1 prot if it does not buy the new input thus selling the low quality nal
good and incurring per-unit cost equal to zero. As the rst constraint is binding
at equilibrium, we have:
max
r1
fV I (0; r1; s ; s ) + r1q1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) + 1 (r1; 0; s ; s )  1 (0; 0; s; s )g
The optimal contract is then:
r1 =
s 
2
; F 1 =  
 2s
(4   1)2
If we let the VI rm to set negative fees, the vertical merger implements the
monopoly outcome by inducing the nonintegrated rm to produce a nil quantity
(foreclosure) and compensating it for the outside option. Equilibrium magni-
tudes are:
qV I (0; r

1 ; s ; s ) =
1
2
= qm
q1 (r

1 ; 0; s ; s ) = 0
pV I =
1
2
 s = pm
V I (0; r

1 ; s ; s ) =
1
4
 s
1 (r

1 ; 0; s ; s )  F 1 =
 2s
(4   1)2
V I = V I (0; r

1 ; s ; s )  f + r1q1 (r1 ; 0; s ; s ) + F 1 =
1
4
 s   
2s
(4   1)2   f
However negative fees would be clearly held to be illegal by antitrust author-
ities. It is clear from the analysis above that the VI rm wants to restrict as
much as possible the quantity produced by the non a¢ liate rm so as to (at
least) partially internalize the vertical externality. If the VI is constrained to
nonnegative fees, it will optimally let the nona¢ liate rm to produce a positive
8 In the following maximization problem we do not restrict the VI rm to set nonnegative
fees. This allows us to make clear its incentives. We next solve the maximization problem
constrained to nonnegative fees.
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quantity q1 (r1) : 1 (r1) =
 2s
(4  1)2 . Given the Cournot equilibrium quantities,
we have 
1
3
(s + r1)  r1

1
3s 
(s   2r1) =  
2s
(4   1)2
() r1 =
 
 s (4   1)  3s p 
2 (4   1)
The optimal contract is then:
rCV I =
 
 s (4   1)  3s p 
2 (4   1) ; F
C
V I = 0: (11)
Equilibrium magnitudes are:
qCV I (0; r

V I ; s ; s ) =
 
4 2    p    
2 (4   1) 
qC1 (r

V I ; 0; s ; s ) =
p
 
(4   1)
QCV I = qV I (0; r

V I ; s ; s ) + q1 (r

V I ; 0; s ; s ) =

4 2    +  32

2 (4   1) 
pCV I =
 
 
4  p   1 s
2 (4   1)
CV I (0; r

V I ; s ; s ) =
 
4 2    p    2 s
4 (4   1)2  
C1 (r

V I ; 0; s ; s )  F V I =
s 2
(4   1)2
CV I = V I (0; r

V I ; s ; s )  f + rV Iq1 (rV I ; 0; s ; s ) + F V I = (
16 2 13 +1)s 
4(4  1)2
CSCV I =
(4 +
p
  1)2s 
8(4  1)2 ;
SWCV I =
(4 +
p
  1)2s 
8(4  1)2 +
s 2
(4  1)2 +
(16 2 13 +1)s 
4(4  1)2
We gather the above results as follows.
Proposition 2 Under Cournot competition, the internal patent holder always
sells the innovation to the rival rm. The optimal contract is specied in (11).
San Martin and Saracho (2010) consider a non drastic process innovation
and show that in a Cournot duopoly with homogeneous goods the optimal li-
censing mode is an ad valorem royalty, that is a prot sharing agreement. This
result does not hold in our model: as we prove in the Appendix the ad valorem
licensing mode is dominated by the two-part tari¤ contract dened in (11). The
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intuition behind this result is as follows. In San Martin and Saracho (2010) the
ad valorem royalty is optimal as the internal patentee introduces the process
innovation that increases total quantity (it let the rival rm to produce with
a more e¢ cient technology) and then appropriates the rivals prot up to its
outside option. In our model if the innovation is di¤used via an ad valorem
royalty total output does not increase (as under homogeneous goods it is inde-
pendent of the quality, see the status quo equilibrium quantity, expression 3).
This implies that industry prots correspond to the duopoly prots that are
shared according to . Whereas under two-part tari¤ the internal patentee can
at least partially internalize the negative externality coming from competition
and approach the monopoly outcome.
5 Private and social protability of vertical in-
tegration
We next consider the merger protability as well as the social welfare compar-
ing the vertical integration scenario with the vertical separation scenario (i.e.,
external patent holder) where complete technology di¤usion takes place.
As far as the private protability is concerned, the merger is always prof-
itable, namely:
CV I 
 
T (s )  F  (r; r) + TU (s )

=
8<:
5(256 4 57 2 112 3 7 +1)s 2
4(32 2 7 +2)2(4  1)2 > 0 for  > 1:585 6;
(  1)(16  1)s 
36(4  1)2 > 0 for  < 1:585 6:
:
This result is in line with the new market foreclosure theory according to which
VI allows the U producer monopolist to protect its monopoly power.9
As for the social protability of VI, we make the following comparisons. For
 < 1:585 6, CSCV I CST = (
4 +
p
  1)2s 
8(4  1)2   29 s =  s

(4 +
p
  1)2
8(4  1)2   29

< 0.
For  > 1:585 6, CSCV I   CST = s 

(4 +
p
  1)2
8(4  1)2  
(4 +16 2+1)
2
2(32 2 7 +2)2

> 0 ()
 > 3:407 8. We can conclude that for  > 3:407 8 both the industry prot
and consumer surplus are higher under VI, that is vertical integration is welfare
improving. In contrast for  < 3:407 8, the result is ambiguous as consumer
surplus is lower but producer surplus is higher under VI rather than the non-
merger case. However direct computations of social welfare (SW = CS + PS)
reveal the following.
SWCV I   SWT < 0 ()  < 3:407 8:
We gather our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Vertical integration is always privately protable. However it
is welfare improving if and only if the innovation is su¢ ciently large, namely
 > 3:407 8.
9See Rey and Tirole 2007.
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Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) consider non-drastic process innovations in
a horizontally di¤erentiated Cournot duopoly and study the patentee incentives
to merge with either rm in the market. They show that the merger is privately
protable for small innovations and it is welfare improving for large innova-
tions. They argue that all protable mergers are welfare detrimental, this also
holds for homogeneous goods. More precisely, Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006)
individuate the following trade-o¤: an internal patentee (VI case) better inter-
nalizes market prot with respect to an external one, however the patentee can
only use one instrument (a contract for the other rm in the market) rather
than two (a contract for each rm in the market). An external patentee has
two instruments but it has to care about rmsoutside option which depends
on the royalty, in particular it increases with the royalty and decreases with the
innovation size. They nd that the balance of these two e¤ects depend on the
innovation size: the merger is privately protable for small innovations, in fact
for large innovations the outside option faced by the external patentee is low
and so it has little relevance with respect to the availability of two instruments.
In our model the merger is protable for any innovation size  . In particular, in
contrast with Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) the internal patentee approaches
the monopoly outcome as the innovation size  increases. In fact, the VI rm
has incentive to reduce as much as possible the quantity produced by the non-
a¢ liate, in order to internalize as much as possible the vertical externality (in
the limit, if allowed, the VI rm would completely foreclose the rival rm com-
pensating it via a negative xed fee). However the VI rm is constrained by the
nona¢ liate outside option: the higher  the lower is this outside option and so
the lower the quantity that the nona¢ liate produces and in turn the more the
VI rm approaches the monopoly outcome. The outside option for the external
patentee is i (0; rj ; s; s ) decreasing in  and increasing in rj . The outside
option for the internal patentee is 1 (0; 0; s; s ) =
 2s
(4  1)2 independent of r
and decreasing in  . For low  , both outside options are large. There is the
same negative e¤ect of Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) related to the external
patentee and so vertical integration dominates vertical separation. For high  ,
both outside options are small, however also in this case vertical integration
dominates as the internal patentee approches the monopoly outcome.
As for social welfare, in contrast with Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) we
nd that, under homogeneous goods, vertical integration is privately and so-
cially protable for high quality improvements. Vertical integration has two
opposite e¤ects on prices: on one hand, VI pushes prices down as it implies
the (partial) internalization of the vertical externality; on the other hand, VI
has an anticompetitive e¤ect because the VI rm is able to (partially) foreclose
the rival rm via a positive per-unit royalty. The rst e¤ect prevails for  high
(and we have pV I   pT < 0), the opposite e¤ect prevails for  low (and we have
pV I   pT > 0).
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6 Bertrand competition
We next extend our analysis to Bertrand competition. This extension allows us
to analyse a post-innovation scenario with product di¤erentiation. Indeed the
innovator has no incentive to sell its product innovation to both rms, as under
Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods, market prots are equal to zero
and therefore he could not extract any surplus from the licensees.
Ex-ante, as goods are homogeneous, equilibrium price is equal to marginal
cost, set to zero. Therefore, the market is covered, i.e., the demand is equal to
one; rms make zero prot and social welfare coincide with consumer surplus
that is:
SWB (s) = CSB (s) =
1Z
0
(s) d =
s
2
:
Under Bertrand competition, the patent holder will sell the new input to only
one rm (otherwise the Bertrand paradox applies). We thus analyse the optimal
contract under exclusive licensing, considering in turn the case of an external
patentee and the case of an internal patentee.
Suppose as before that rm 1 is the non-innovating rm that produces a nal
good of quality s1 = s at price p1; rm 2 is the innovating rm that produces a
nal good of quality s2 =  s > s, at price p2. The demands for the goods are
the same as in (5) and (6), in particular:
q1 =
p2   p1
s (   1)  
p1
s
; q2 = 1  p2   p1
s (   1) :
D rms prots are:
1 = p1q1; 2 = (p2   r2) q2   F2:
Bertrand competition leads to the following third stage prices and quantity equi-
librium:
p1 (0; r2; s; s ) =
s   s+ r2
4   1 ;
p2 (r2; 0; s ; s) =
2 (s   s+ r2)
4   1
q1 (0; r2; s; s ) =
(s   s+ r2) 
(   1) (4   1) s
q2 (r2; 0; s ; s) =
2 s (   1)  r2 (2   1)
(   1) (4   1) s
with q2 (r2; 0; s ; s) > 0 () r2 < 2 s(  1)(2  1) .10 Firm 1 prot is then:
1 (0; r2; s; s ) =
(s   s+ r2)2  
(4   1)2 (   1) s
10This inequality is more stringent than the corresponding one under Cournot competition.
Namely, s(2  1)
2
>
2 s(  1)
(2  1) .
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As for rm 2:
2 (r2; 0; s ; s) =
(2 s (   1)  r2 (2   1))2
(4   1)2 (   1) s   F2
The U rm chooses the two-part tari¤ contract for rm 2 (r2; F2) such that:
max
r2;F2
U
s:t:r2 2

0;
2 s (   1)
(2   1)

F2  (2s  r2+2 r2 2s 
2)
2
(4  1)2(  1)s  
(s  s+r2)2 
(4  1)2(  1)s
with U =
2 s(  1) r2(2  1)
(  1)(4  1)s r2 + F2   f . The rst constraint comes from the
non-negativity of q2 and the second constraint (binding at equilibrium) ensures
that rm 2 has the incentive to get the license rather than the outside option,
that we assume to be equal to 1 (0; r2; s; s ) > 0.11 The optimal contract is:
rB2 = 0; F
B
2 =
(   1) s 
(4   1) : (12)
A product innovation is sold via a xed fee, this is due to the fact that the
rival rm has zero marginal cost.12 This result is in contrast with a process
innovation (Muto, 1993). Remaining equilibrium variables are:
qB1 =
 
(4   1) ; q
B
2 =
2 
(4   1) ; QB =
3 
(4   1) (13)
pB1 =
(   1) s
4   1 ; p
B
2 =
2 s (   1)
4   1 ; (14)
1 (s; s ) =
(  1)s 
(4  1)2 = 2 (s ; s) =
(  1)s 
(4  1)2
BU (s; s ) =
(  1)s 
(4  1)   f:
BU is the U patent holder prot under exclusive licensing, when selling via
a two-part tari¤, which reduces to a xed fee, the new input to only one D
rm. For completeness we provide equilibrium consumer surplus under Bertrand
competition:
CSB = (4 +5)s 
2
2(4  1)2 : (15)
Consider next the case of an internal patentee, in particular assume that the
U producer and rm 2 merge. The VI rm does not sell the innovation to the
11 In fact rm 2 can always refuse the o¤er of the patent holder knowing that he will make
the o¤er to the rival rm. Therefore the outside option is not zero (the status quo prot),
rather it is positive and equal to the low quality rms prot.
12 If the rival rm had a positive marginal cost of production, say c > 0, (so that the
innovation would include the product as well as the process) then the optimal contract would
be r2 = c2 > 0, F2 =
4 s2(  1)+4cs +c2(1 4 )
4(4  1)s .
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rival so that we have an equilibrium such that the VI rm produces the high
quality good at zero costs and compete with the rival rm 1 that produces the
low quality good at zero cost. Equilibrium quantities, prices and CS are as in
(13), (14) and (15), equilibrium prots are
B1 =
(  1)s 
(4  1)2
BV I = 4
(  1)s 2
(4  1)2
As for the merger private and social protability under Bertrand competition
we nd that:
BV I  
 
2 (s ; s)  FB2 +BU (s )

= 0; SWBV I   SWB = 0:
The patent holder is indi¤erent between staying out of the market and vertically
integrate. The same holds from the social welfare point of view. The above
results are gathered in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Under Bertrand competition the patent holder always prefers
exclusive licensing. (i) An external patent holder prefers to sell its product
innovation via a xed fee rather than a royalty (the optimal contract is specied
in (12)). (ii) An internal patent holder does not license its innovation. (iii)
The equilibrium prices, quantities and social welfare are independent of whether
the patent holder stays out of the market or vertically integrate with either rm.
We conclude our analysis by comparing the private and social protability of
Cournot vs Bertrand competition. Under Cournot competition, at equilibrium
vertical integration takes place and technology di¤usion is complete, so that
we have a homogeneous high quality good in the market; in constrast under
Bertrand competition, at equilibrium exclusive licensing occurs, so that the
market is vertically di¤erentiated.
We nd that from the rmspoint of view, the producer surplus is higher
under Cournot than under Bertrand competition, namely:13
V I   BV I =

(16 2 13 +1)s 
4(4  1)2   4
(  1)s 2
(4  1)2

=
s 
(4   1)2
1
4
(3 + 1) > 0
s 2
(4  1)2 +
(16 2 13 +1)s 
4(4  1)2  

4 (  1)s 
2
(4  1)2 +
(  1)s 
(4  1)2

=
1
4
(4   1) 2 (3 + 5) s > 0
As for consumer surplus and welfare, the comparison depends on the quality
improvement, in particular total social welfare is higher under Cournot than
under Bertrand competition for  su¢ ciently high:
SWV I   SWB =

11  21 2 2 32+8 52

s
8(4  1)2 > 0 ()  > 6:28
This result is clearly linked to the fact that on one hand, under Cournot,
competition is milder than under Bertrand where both qualities stays on sale;
on the other hand, under Cournot, complete technology di¤usion arises so that
the average quality is higher than under Bertrand competition.
13This is in line with Singh and Vives (1984).
16
7 Conclusion
We have analysed the optimal licensing strategy of an upstream input innovator
producing a new input which improves the quality of the nal goods. We have
considered a duopoly downstream market and have shown that under Cournot
competition complete technology di¤usion takes place and the innovator always
prefers to be inside the market as the vertical merger with either downstream
rm is always privately protable. It is also welfare improving for large in-
novations. In contrast, under Bertrand competition exclusive licensing takes
place and we nd an indi¤erent result between vertical integration and vertical
separation from both the private and social welfare point of view.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Ad valorem royalty
Suppose (under Corunot competition) the internal patentee (the VI rm) de-
cides to sell the innovation via an ad valorem royalty, that is a prot sharing
agreement. Firmsprots are then: PS1 = (1  ) pq1, PSV I = pqV I + pq1
where  2 [0; 1] is the ad valorem royalty. The equilibrium ad valorem royalty
is the  such that the licensee is indi¤erent between buying and not buying the
innovation, i.e.:
 : (1  ) s 
9
=
 2s
(4   1)2
()  = (   1) (16   1)
(4   1)2 2 (0; 1) :
Industry prot is 2 s 9 , 
PS
V I =
s 
9 +
(  1)(16  1)
(4  1)2
s 
9 and

V I PSV I = (  1)(16  1)s 36(4  1)2 >
0.
8.2 Social welfare comparisons
For completeness we provide equilibrium social welfare under exclusive licensing:
SWEL = PSEL+CSEL =

(36 2 16 +1)(  1)s
9(4  1)2 +
 2s
(4  1)2 +
s
9

+
( +4 2 1)s 
2(4  1)2
where CSEL =
p2 p1
s(  1)Z
p1
s
(s  p1) d +
1Z
p2 p1
s(  1)
(s   p2) d. The remaining social
welfare comparisons are: for  < 1:585 6, SWT SWEL = s

2
9 +

2  
2
(4  1)2 + 2
(  1)(16  1) 
9(4  1)2

 
s

(36 2 16 +1)(  1)
9(4  1)2 +
 2
(4  1)2 +
1
9

+
( +4 2 1) 
2(4  1)2

> 0; for  > 1:585 6,
SWT   SWEL = s

 
(4 +16 2+1)
2
2(32 2 7 +2)2 +

2 25(4  1)
2 2
4(32 2 7 +2)2 +
(16 2 16 +1) 
2(32 2 7 +2)

 
s

(36 2 16 +1)(  1)
9(4  1)2 +
 2
(4  1)2 +
1
9

+
( +4 2 1) 
2(4  1)2

> 0. SWCV I SWEL =
s

(4 +
p
  1)2 
8(4  1)2 +
 2
(4  1)2 +
(16 2 13 +1) 
4(4  1)2

 s

(36 2 16 +1)(  1)
9(4  1)2 +
 2
(4  1)2 +
1
9

+
( +4 2 1) 
2(4  1)2

.
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For high values of  ( > 3:407 8), social welfare ranking is SWCV I > SW
T >
SWEL. For  < 3:407 8, we have SWT > SWCV I and SW
T > SWEL.
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